Nahe Biti
After the Timor Leste independence referendum in 1999, there was an urgent need to reintegrate over 100,000 refugees in West Timor, while also taking care to prioritize social reconstruction with accountability and justice (Babo-Soares, 2004). Consequently, Timor Leste worked with the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), and passed Regulation 2001/10 in July 2001, to establish the truth concerning human rights violations following Indonesia’s invasion, from 1974 to 1999 (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste, 2005). This endeavour sought to conduct community reconciliation procedures for crimes committed during the window of time named here, and to make suitable recommendations to the government.
In achieving this, indigenous and local mechanisms of justice played an important role. Grassroots reconciliation was considered vital given that most perpetrators came from the same villages as their victims (Babo-Soares, 2004). The people themselves wanted strict punishments for serious offenders, but community-based mechanisms for perpetrators of crimes that were less serious. The failure of the political elite to arrive at a reconciliation among themselves led to the community having to take care of itself. The less serious offences under consideration in these community reconciliation procedures included theft, minor assault, arson that did not result in death or injury, and the killing of livestock and destruction of crops.
In this mechanism, a refugee or perpetrator made a statement to the local Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) representative, naming the criminal acts committed (Babo-Soares, 2004). The statement was then sent to the Office of the General Prosecutor, who reviewed the case to ensure that it was not a serious crime and could well follow the community reconciliation procedure. Next, a formal Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) was set up in the community, bringing the perpetrator together with a panel of three to five local leaders, a regional commissioner, members of the community, and the victim(s) of the crimes committed. A hearing took place, where statements were made by all stakeholders – chiefly the perpetrator, victim(s), and members of the panel. The perpetrator publicly named his crimes, and asked for forgiveness (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste, 2005).
Following this, the panel explored appropriate acts of reconciliation, including community service, reparations, public apologies, and other acts of contrition as appropriate to the context (Burgess, 2004). Bringing the victims’ perspectives into the decision, a Community Reconciliation Agreement (CRA) was crafted (Babo-Soares, 2004).
Before closing the process, a ritual was conducted to legitimize the agreement. The ritual specifically involved communally chewing betel nuts while sitting on a large mat. The act of unrolling, stretching out, or laying down the mat is called Nahe biti (Babo-Soares, 2004; Piers, 2005). It is intended to be a metaphor for the community coming together to discuss and resolve their differences. The biti boot, or the large mat, would be unrolled in the presence of ritual elders who opened the meetings by addressing their forefathers. All participants dressed in traditional clothes. The involvement of both rituals, traditional leaders, and ritual elders lent validity to the process (Hohe, 2003).
The outcome is legally binding, as the CRA is registered in a district court as binding the perpetrator by law (Hohe, 2003). Failure to comply with the CRA would elicit punishment including imprisonment for a year and/or a fine of up to USD 3000 (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste, 2005; Piers, 2005).
Through this process, nearly 1400 perpetrators completed a CRP and created CRAs, and around 30,000 to 40,000 members attended and participated in a CRP proceeding (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste, 2005). A powerful pattern across all proceedings concerned the strength of the perpetrator’s apology in determining whether they should be accepted back into the community – the focus was not on punitive consequences for their admission or apology (Hohe, 2003; Belo Ximenes, 2004). The voluntary nature of the proceedings, however, came with a limitation: Some perpetrators chose not to go through with it (Hohe, 2003).
Even as it was successful, unfortunately, its time-bound operations meant that several cases were not included or addressed. The more serious crimes were tried by a hybrid court, the Special Unit for Serious Crimes – but it failed in performing its key duties. As a result, more people who perpetrated less serious crimes were held accountable, than those who perpetrated serious and grave crimes (Hohe, 2003).
References
Babo-Soares, Dionisio. "Nahe Biti: The Philosophy and Process of Grassroots Reconciliation (and Justice) in East Timor." The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 5, no. 1 (April 2004): 15-33.
Belo Ximenes, Fausto. The Unique Contribution of the Community-Based Reconciliation Process in East Timor. Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), May 28, 2004.
Burgess, Patrick. "Justice and Reconcliation in East Timor: The Relationship between the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation and the Courts." Criminal Law Forum 15 (2004): 135-158.
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste. Chega! The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Timor-Leste: Executive Summary. Dili, Timor-Leste: 2005.
Hohe, Tanja. "Justice without judiciary in East Timor." Conflict, Security and Development 3, no. 3 (2003): 335-357.
Piers, Pigou. The Community Reconciliation Process of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Timor-Leste, April 2005. http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/Analysis/Laporan%20Piers%20tentang%20CRP.pdf
